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Abstract 
 
Voluntary HIV testing in the workplace was offered to two groups of employees; 
in one case informing about a reward offered for voluntary testing and in the 
other case not.  
 
Both groups were asked to complete a questionnaire before the testing. The 
study’s hypothesis was that incentives significantly increase employees’ 
willingness to participate in on-site voluntary counselling and testing. 
 
A t-test for significance of difference between both groups‘ means was done 
and results indicate that the offer of incentives significantly increases the uptake 
of voluntary testing in the workplace. 
 
Advantages of these results are discussed in this thesis. 
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Opsomming 
 
Vrywillige MIV toetsing is aan twee groepe werknemers aangebied; in die een 
geval is ‘n beloning geheg aan die vrywillige toetsing en in die ander geval nie. 
 
‘n Vooraf opgestelde vraelys is by beide groep voor die tyd afgeneem. Die 
hipotese van die studie was dat aansporing beduidend sou bydra tot die 
gewilligheid om deel te neem aan  MIV toetsing in die werksplek. 
 
‘n T-toets vir beduidendheid van verskille tussen gemmideldes is tussen die 
twee groepe gedoen en resultate dui daarop dat die aanbied van ‘n beloning 
beduidend bydra tot die beter opname van vrywillige toetsing in die werksplek. 
 
Voordele van hierdie resultate word in die tesis bespreek. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The idea that money drives our behaviour is so much part of our culture that we 
rarely step back to think about it. Two-for-one deals on anything from food 
products to clothing, cut-prices airline tickets or the promise of big annual 
bonuses drive our consumer and work-life choices. So the question arises, why 
not use money to drive health behaviour in the fight against HIV&AIDS in the 
workplace? 
 
The HI virus impacts not only on the internal systems of an individual’s body, but 
also on all aspects of society like family, community and businesses. South 
Africa has one of the highest workforce HIV&AIDS statistics in the world. The 
International Labour Office, ILO (2006:86), estimated in 2005 that 3.6 million 
South African labour force participants in the age between 15 and 65 were HIV 
positive. UNAIDS reported that in a South African Sugar Mill, HIV infected 
employees have visited a clinic 20 times and have taken 17 full days of sick 
leave during the two years preceding their retirement. The cost of absenteeism, 
provision of hospital and medical care, and training and wages for new 
employee replacements was about R8,465 per year and per HIV positive 
employee (UNAIDS, 2000:15). The mining company Gold Field South Africa 
estimated that HIV&AIDS would have added US$10 per ounce gold produced 
without any intervention (Augustyn, 2009:5). 
 
Facing these consequences, many South African companies implement 
HIV&AIDS workplace programmes (WPPs). One crucial element of these 
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 workplace interventions is voluntary counselling and testing (VCT)1 for 
employees to acknowledge their serostatus. Testing results allow companies to 
determine the HIV prevalence rate within their workforce and so be able to 
address company’s HIV&AIDS economical impacts more effectively. Knowledge 
of serostatus through VCT can be a motivating force for HIV positive and 
negative employees alike to adopt safer sexual behaviour, which enables HIV 
positive employees to prevent their sexual partners from getting infected and 
those who test seronegative to remain negative (Baggaley et al, 2002:7). As 
free antiretroviral therapies become more available in South Africa, VCT is the 
necessary step for employees and their families to access treatment. 
 
South African law imposes that attendance to VCT is voluntary; this means that 
the decision to have an HIV test must be entirely the choice of the individual. To 
reach high VCT uptake, companies have to find effective ways to motivate as 
many as possible employees to go testing on-site and acknowledge their HIV 
status. One possibility is the use of incentives. Incentives can be offered to steer 
people's choices in certain directions. 
 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) tend to lack the experience to 
implement VCT interventions successfully (Fraser et al. as cited in Mundy et al., 
2004:177) and consequently might not have a lot of experience how to motivate 
their employees to go testing. This could lead South African SMEs to invest in 
VCT without enough consideration of the efficiency of factors affecting VCT 
uptake. The result could be a waste of limited resources. A  review of literature 
failed to identify research about how financial incentives support participation in 
VCT amongst employees in South African SMEs. The paper “Paying the 
                                                 
1 “VCT”, “HIV testing” and “testing” are used as synonyms in this paper.  
2 
 
 Patient” finds that financial incentives are effective in encouraging people to 
perform clearly defined, time limited, simple behavioural tasks (Jochelson, 
2007:2). As on-site VCT is a clearly defined, time limited, simple behavioural 
task, Jochelson’s statement gives a hint that financial incentives could be 
effective in encouraging employees on-site VCT uptake.  
 
This field experiment investigated if incentives significantly increase employees’ 
willingness to participate in on-site VCT. After a literature review and 
presentation of experiment and findings, the advantages of the results will be 
discussed. 
 
2. Research objectives 
 
The objectives of this research paper were to: 
 
- Find out if the hypothesis “incentives significantly increase employees’ 
willingness to participate in on-site Voluntary Counselling and Testing” is 
held, following Jochelson’s statement that financial incentives are 
effective in encouraging people to perform clearly defined, time limited, 
simple behavioural tasks (Jochelson, 2007:2). 
 
- Contribute to the process of finding out if incentives should become a 
best practice tool to be included in SMEs’ HIV&AIDS WPPs by providing 
data that allow managers and researchers to estimate the lever 
incentives worth R3000 have on employees’ on-site VCT uptake in 
similar settings. 
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3. Incentives for HIV testing in the workplace: A literature review 
 
The “commissioning and behavioural change” final report states that the idea of 
“nudging” the public to make healthier choices is gaining favour (Boyce at al., 
2008:12f). The concept of ‘nudging’ acknowledges that we should all have 
freedom of choice, but purports that employers should encourage or ‘nudge’ 
employees to do the right thing (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). ‘Nudging’ could be 
an effective way to encourage healthier behaviour.  
 
The attraction of financial incentives as a ‘nudging’ tool in VCT lies in their 
potential to increase the on-site HIV testing rate in a cost effective way. VCT, as 
a crucial part of companies’ HIV&AIDS WPPs, allows companies to determine 
the HIV prevalence rate within the workforce and so be able to address 
company’s HIV&AIDS economical impacts more effectively. The “Debswana - A 
global benchmark” study revealed that the prevalence survey served as a 
turning point in Debswana’s approach to company’s fight against HIV&AIDS 
(UNAIDS, 2002). VCT is also the primary access point to HIV&AIDS clinical 
care and psychological support (Rogers as cited in Mundy, 2004:178), and 
provides an opportunity for education and motivation to modify behaviour aimed 
at reducing the risk of HIV&AIDS transmission (Lancet as cited in Mundy, 2004: 
178). As free antiretroviral therapies become more available in South Africa, 
VCT is the necessary step for employees and their families to be able to access 
treatment and to improve their quality of life. Hence, the more ‘nudged’ 
employees go for VCT and know their HIV status, the more the costs of 
HIV&AIDS impact on companies might be reduced. 
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 From an economic perspective, an incentive is an offer of something of value, 
sometimes with a cash equivalent and sometimes not, that is used to influence 
the payoff structure of a utility calculation so as to alter a person's course of 
action (Grant, 2002:111). The company offering the incentive wants to make the 
choice to test for HIV in the workplace more attractive to the employees 
responding to the incentive than any other alternative (not testing or testing 
outside the company). It is a form of trade that involves voluntary action by all 
parties involved. The result is supposed to be beneficial to all parties concerned. 
If these conditions were not met, the trade would simply not occur (Grant, 
2002:111).  
 
From a psychological point of view, when motivation to change is low, a 
financial incentive offers an expectation of a reward for making the choice to 
change that in itself might not be sought after (Jochelson, 2007:3). In our case, 
the motivation to change and to do an on-site HIV test is, for a considerable 
number of employees, a choice that in itself is not sought after. Combined with 
the WPP awareness around HIV&AIDS, the offer of incentives for HIV testing is 
a reward that conveys feed back about competence and may enhance intrinsic 
motivation for making the choice to participate in company’s VCT and reinforce 
individuals sense of autonomy (Cameron at al. as cited in Jochelson, 2007:9). 
 
Finally, from a “neuro-economic” point of view, incentives might activate the 
striatum, the reward centre of the brain, ordering the release of dopamine, a 
substance that gives the body a positive feeling. At the same time, the brain 
control system, the anteriore cingulum, responsible for making reasonable 
decisions, is inhibited (Ehlers at al., 2009:47). Humans exposed to financial 
incentives are very seducible because they activate the rewarding system in the 
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 brain (Ehlers at al., 2009:47). Employees are worried about the idea of 
somebody else winning the incentive. They want at least as much as their 
colleagues, never less. Going for VCT is for good causes: Taking care of one’s 
health and family’s future and fighting HIV&AIDS. Employees think that 
incentives are offered by the company to reward them and not to betray them. 
Employees want to participate because everybody else is participating as well. 
From this perspective, incentives could be a trick to increase VCT uptake. 
Research still has to define how strong this neurological effect is. 
 
Very little is published on the use of financial incentives in companies to 
influence employees’ VCT uptake although incentives are frequently used in the 
health sector (for example to change behaviour around alcohol, smoking, drugs 
and nutrition like described in Jochelson (2007)), and although the researcher 
has observed that many companies in South African automotive sector regularly 
make use of incentives in their VCT campaigns. 
 
A case study conducted on six randomly selected South African SMEs 
investigated the impact and management of HIV&AIDS in the workplace (Vass 
et al., 2006). The study sought to document the experiences of SMEs in 
managing the HIV&AIDS burden and to draw out possible lessons and best 
practice. The case study observed that because of declining participation in 
VCT one of the companies put up an incentives programme as one of six tools 
to encourage employees to be tested, involving a voucher system and 
chocolates (Vass et al., 2006:37). But no results on the effect of the used 
incentives on VCT uptake were given. 
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 Rebecca Thornton states that many argue that there are huge monetary and 
psychological costs to learning HIV status but finds in her study that these 
barriers can be easily overcome (Thornton, 2005). After being tested for HIV, 
individuals in rural Malawi were randomly assigned monetary incentives to 
return for their results. Without any monetary incentives, demand for knowing 
HIV status was moderate: 39% of those tested returned to learn their HIV 
results. However, randomly assigned monetary rewards had large and 
significant effects on learning HIV results and increased overall attendance to 
counselling centres by over 100%. Thornton concluded that these results have 
strong policy implications for designing interventions to increase testing, 
especially as antiretroviral therapies become more available. 
 
An HIV counselling and testing programme funded by the American Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention focused “on increasing HIV testing of Persons 
at High Risk in Communities of Color” in the United States of America (Cooper, 
2003). The target population were individuals who are at increased risk for 
contracting HIV&AIDS due to their high-risk sexual behaviour, drug-taking 
behaviour, and past/current exposure to sexually transmitted diseases. All 
individuals were informed that they would receive an incentive upon their return 
to get their HIV results. The study found that 50% of all clients tested did so 
because they were aware of the post-test incentive. Of the 700 individuals 
tested for HIV, 595 of those individuals returned for post-test counselling 
sessions due to the incentives offered. When asked what brought them to the 
agency for testing, 85% of the population replied that they were informed that 
they could get a grocery store certificate for getting tested. Cooper concluded 
that a majority of clients who request HIV testing do so because they are aware 
of the incentives offered upon their return for the post-test counselling session. 
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 Although many people do not agree with the use of incentives, they are useful 
when drawing high-risk individuals to get tested and learning HIV test results 
(Cooper, 2003). 
 
In these two last studies, VCT was done in two separate steps: The pre-
counselling session that included pre-test counselling and blood or saliva 
collection, and a second session, where people were informed about their 
serostatus and received post-test counselling. Financial incentives were only 
used to reward people to participate in the second step of VCT. They were not 
used to encourage people to do the HIV test. They were also not used in a 
company setting.  
 
Jochelson found that health programmes that rely on financial incentives as a 
lever to promote healthier behaviour are attractive as they are simple and easy 
to implement but her study “Paying the patient” does not include observations 
on financial incentives used to encourage employees to participate in on-site 
VCT in SMEs.  
 
Her review suggests that financial incentives are effective in encouraging people 
to perform clearly defined, time limited, simple behavioural tasks (Jochelson, 
2007:2). Jochelson’s statement gives a hint that financial incentives could be 
effective in encouraging employees to perform the clearly defined, time limited, 
simple behavioural task of VCT. 
 
Jochelson states that financial incentives may be useful as one element of a 
multi-faceted programme that addresses the complexity of individual, social and 
economic factors that affect human behaviour. 
8 
 
 She concludes that further research is needed to understand when incentives 
are likely to be most effective in encouraging the adoption of healthier 
behaviours and wether long-term incentive schemes can enable people to 
maintain changes in behaviour (Jochelson, 2007).  
 
She found that following factors may contribute to the success of financial 
incentives: value, timing, social support and skills (Jochelson, 2007:6f). This 
study’s experiment only considers one specific setting of the above four factors 
as described in the following. 
 
Evidence suggests that the size of the incentive is important (Jochelson, 
2007:6). Jochelson found that where interventions catered to low income 
groups, it is evident that the financial incentive lowered the barrier of entry to the 
healthier lifestyle. Even where studies did not specify the socio-economic 
breakdown of their target population the size of an incentive was still significant. 
The design of this study’s experiment considered this evidence when 
determining the size of the incentives. 
 
Lucier et al. suggests that both the value and the immediacy of feedback are 
important reinforcer of behaviour change (Lucier at al. as cited in Jochelson, 
2007:7). For this reason, it was made sure in this study that all experiment 
participants knew that the incentives would be distributed the day after the HIV 
testing. 
 
Jochelson states that lifestyle change is complex because it may challenge 
accepted behaviour in an individual’s support and social network. There is 
extensive literature that shows that individuals adapt their behaviour to meet 
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 what they imagine are the expectations of people significant to them (Jochelson, 
2007:7). In both companies’ HIV&AIDS WPPs, the peer educators had been 
selected as respected and significant colleagues. They were also selected 
because of demonstrated role model behaviour in fighting HIV&AIDS. All peer 
educators fully supported the VCT campaign throughout the whole programme. 
These peer educators announced the incentives in this experiment. 
 
Individuals need skills and confidence to enact a proposed change, particularly 
with lifestyle behaviours. In this study, all participants had been in several 
awareness trainings done by companies’ peer educators about HIV&AIDS. They 
all were involved in the set-up of the HIV&AIDS policy and knew its content. 
They all were informed about how VCT works and the existing referral systems 
for those employees and family members that might test HIV positive.  
 
In her quantitative (descriptive, statistical, and content) analysis of data study 
“Factors affecting the uptake of voluntary HI&AIDS counselling and testing 
(VCT) services in the workplace”, Janet Mundy wanted to identify the factors 
affecting VCT uptake amongst workers in medium-sized enterprises (Mundy, 
2004).  
 
She found that perception of company support, proximity to people that have, or 
have died of HIV&AIDS and VCT confidentiality were among factors found to 
have influenced uptake, but permanent employment status was the most 
significant factor associated with test participation.  
 
Mundy’s research also indicated that HIV&AIDS WPPs must ensure that post-
VCT benefits are understood, are accessible to all staff and their families, 
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 involve active employee representation, and seek to reduce the social and 
political barriers to HIV&AIDS care and support access if they want to be 
successful. Even if these criteria are fulfilled, influences and interventions that 
encourage one employee to participate may fail to encourage, or even deter 
others. 
 
Her study also found that knowledge alone is insufficient to change VCT 
behaviour and encourage regular testing, the ultimate aim of best-practice 
HIV&AIDS interventions. 
 
Mundy did not investigate if financial incentives are a significant factor 
associated with HIV test participation. 
 
4. Research problem 
 
The aim of this research paper is to determine if the use of financial incentives 
in SMEs leads to a significantly greater percentage of employees going for on-
site VCT. It should provide data that allow managers and researchers to 
estimate the lever incentives worth R3000 have on employees’ on-site VCT 
uptake in similar settings. Ultimately, it wants to contribute to the process of 
finding out if incentives should become a best practice tool to be included in 
SMEs’ HIV&AIDS WPPs. 
 
In essence, the research problem to be discussed and analysed is: Do 
incentives significantly increase employees’ on-site VCT uptake?  
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 The term “VCT”, in this experiment, is defined in terms of on-site pre-test and 
post-test counselling, associated with employees testing and acknowledging 
their HIV test result. All steps of VCT are done in one session and individually 
by an external accredited service provider. It is impossible in a field experiment 
to reliably study the effect of incentives on employees’ VCT uptake directly as 
many factors affect employees choice to go for VCT in medium-sized 
manufacturing companies (Mundi at al., 2004:176): Perception of company’s 
support, proximity to people that have, or have died of HIV&AIDS, VCT 
confidentiality and permanent employment status are amongst factors found to 
have influenced VCT uptake. This multitude of factors make it difficult to reliably 
isolate and quantify the effect of incentives on employees’ choice to go HIV 
testing if  employees were asked directly after the HIV test. But if an employee, 
two weeks before company’s announced HIV testing day and after being 
informed about the offer of incentives for HIV testing, is more willing to 
participate in VCT than when he/she is not informed about the incentives, it is 
possible to say that employee’s attitude towards VCT uptake has changed 
because of incentives. In this case, an increase in VCT uptake is inferred from 
an increase in employee’s willingness to participate in VCT.  
 
The term “incentives” is defined as tangible financial items rewarding employees 
directly for the outcome of knowing their HIV status.  
 
The term  “employee” is defined  as the shop-floor employee (permanent and 
non-permanent staff) that worked in shifts A and B in both companies during the 
experiment. 
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 “Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs)” are defined as South African 
automotive supplier companies that have more than 50 and less than 250 
employees (permanent and non-permanent staff together).  
 
At the time of the experiment, the researcher had implemented a 
comprehensive HIV&AIDS workplace programme embedded in company’s 
wellness programme in both companies. Both programmes were at the same 
stage of progress when the experiments took place and, in both companies, on-
site VCT was offered for the first time to employees. 
 
To determine if incentives affected employee’s willingness for voluntary 
counselling and testing,  employee’s willingness to participate in VCT was 
operationalised and expressed by asking them to answer the question “If the 
company would organise its on-site wellness day tomorrow, I would go testing 
for HIV&AIDS tomorrow”. 
 
5. Method 
 
Two companies, named company V and company M in the following, were 
randomly selected through a draw out of five SMEs the researcher was working 
with at the time of the experiment. All SMEs were at the same stage of 
HIV&AIDS WPP implementation. They all had in common, that no HIV&AIDS 
WPP had been implemented in the past and no on-site VCT had ever been 
offered to employees. All companies belonged to the same industrial sector and 
had similar skill requirements.  
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 A field experimental research design was used as a quantitative approach to 
allow discovering the effects (willingness to go for VCT) of presumed causes 
(incentives) in a real company life setting (Christensen, 2007:87).  
 
5.1. Participants  
 
In both selected companies, the experiment population was exclusively 
composed of all shop-floor employees and equalled the sum of all shop floor 
employees present in two shifts A and B. All shop-floor employees had equally 
participated in an HIV&AIDS workplace programme the researcher was 
implementing at the time of the experiment.  
 
Company V had a total staff of 100 persons from which all 66 shop-floor 
employees were targeted for the experiment. Company M had a total staff of 90 
persons from which all 65 shop-floor employees were targeted for the 
experiment. On both experiment days, no leave or sick leave was reported. 
 
In both companies, the composition of shift A and shift B could not be 
influenced. Employees were allocated to these shifts according to the needs of 
production by the production managers that were not aware of the experiment. 
 
In company V, production manager’s allocation lead to a big difference in the 
amount of employees in shift A and B. The morning shift A was composed of 48 
employees, the afternoon shift B was composed of 18 employees. The mean 
age in shift A was 29,3 years and 32,7 years in shift B. There were 62.5% males 
in shift A and 66.7% males in shift B. 62% were singles in shift A and 56% in 
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 shift B. 60.4% of shift A had matric or lower education compared to 61.1% for 
shift B. 39.6% were contractors in shift A compared to 38.9 in shift B. A 
comparison of both shifts show  that apart from the group size differences of 
shift A and B, both groups have similar demographics and can be considered as 
comparable. 
 
Company M had a shift A composed of 34 employees and a shift B composed 
of 31 employees which together makes up a population of 65. The mean age in 
shift A was 37.2 years and 32.6 years in shift B. There were 52.9% males in 
shift A and 71% males in shift B. 41.2% were singles in shift A and 64.5% in 
shift B. 73.5% of shift A had matric or lower education compared to 54.8% for 
shift B. 50% were contractors in shift A compared to 58.1% in shift B. A 
comparison of both shifts show  that apart from gender composition, differences 
in marital status and education, both groups have similar demographics and can 
be considered as comparable. 
 
A comparison of shift A and B in both companies shows that there are small 
demographics differences between the two samples in both companies. For 
practical purposes it was assumed that they are comparable and data were 
treated as such. 
 
All companies had, at the time of the experiment, the same HIV&AIDS 
programme implementation level including awareness around HIV&AIDS and 
VCT, policy implementation, knowledge about free existing care and treatment 
options for them and their families (including free antiretroviral treatment in 
public clinics or through medical aid) and free availability of condoms. The 
HIV&AIDS programme was embedded in a Wellness Programme. It can be 
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 assumed that all experiment’s participants were at the same HIV&AIDS WPP 
training level in both companies. All employees were aware that free on-site 
VCT and other health tests were offered on a wellness day scheduled two 
weeks later. The information about the offer of incentives as a reward for 
participating in on-site VCT had not been spread in both companies before shift 
B employees started working the day of the experiment. 
 
5.2. Measuring Instruments 
 
Questionnaires were used to ask a specific set of 15 questions on how 
employees felt about various factors of their company’s wellness programme 
(see annexure A). The same questionnaire was used in both companies. 
Originally, the questionnaires were designed to allow feed-back on the quality of 
companies’ wellness programme which included the HIV&AIDS WPP. 
Company’s and funders’ logos were printed on the questionnaire. As companies 
wished to stay anonymous, logos are not visible in annexure A. Participants 
were asked to give their own opinion and were informed about the voluntariness 
and confidentiality of the questionnaire. The questionnaire stated that all 
participants would receive a pen for completing the questionnaire.  
 
The relevant question for this study’s experiment was hidden as question 
number ten: “If the company would organise its on-site Wellness Day tomorrow, 
I would go testing for HIV&AIDS tomorrow.”  
 
At any time of the experiment, participants were not informed about the 
experiment. To verify if the samples that answered the questionnaire (shift A 
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 and shift B) were representative for the population, socio–demographic data 
were collected in part one of the questionnaire. This made it possible to 
compare shift A with shift B in both companies.  
 
For question 1 to 15 a Likert scale was used. The Likert scale is also called the 
summative scale, as the result of a questionnaire is often achieved by summing 
numerical assignments to the responses given (changingminds.org, 2009). This 
scale is an ordered, one-dimensional scale from which participants chose one 
option that best aligns with their view. Five options were used. Assertions were 
used, with which participants may agree or disagree to varying degrees. In 
scoring, numbers from 1 to 5 were assigned to each option. 
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = neutral 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
 
The results of the questionnaires have been achieved by summing the 
numerical assignments to the responses given.  
 
To inform shift B employees in both companies about the offer of incentives as a 
reward for on-site HIV&AIDS testing, a flyer was designed (see annexure B). 
This flyer informed shift B employees about the possibility to do a free on-site 
HIV test on wellness day. It announced the date of company’s wellness day 
(approximately fourteen days later) and informed in detail about the incentives 
that could be won. All employee that would get tested on wellness day would be 
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 entered into a lucky draw with a chance to win a R2000 gift voucher as first 
prize, a R500 voucher as second prize and another ten R50 vouchers. The flyer 
also reminded employees that HIV testing on-site is free on wellness day, that 
knowing their status can save their lives, that their HIV-status is confidential and 
that discrimination on basis of status is illegal. 
 
5.3. Procedure 
 
The researcher was not involved in distributing or collecting the questionnaires. 
During the experiments, he was not visible to the participants. He was however 
present in the company to discreetly observe and give explanations to the peer 
educators that distributed the questionnaires. These explanations were given in 
a private meeting with the peer educators present in the shift previous to the 
questionnaires’ distribution. These peer educators were not informed about the 
experiment at any time of the experiment. 
 
Companies’ management was informed about the experiment and the 
procedures. Management was explicitly asked not to talk about the experiment 
to any other staff member. 
 
The experiment was first done in company V and two days later in company M. 
Company V and company M are completely separate companies. They are 
situated 50 kilometres from each other and one can assume that company V’s 
employees did not have contact to company M’s employees between the 
experiments. 
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 In both companies, all shift A employees received the questionnaire. The 
questionnaires were distributed by a team of two peer educators without any 
further information about incentives. Both peer educators were not aware of the 
experiment and the future use of incentives to reward employees that participate 
in company’s on-site HIV testing. They were briefed by the researcher just 
before shift A began that the questionnaire was part of a survey to get shop floor 
employees’ feed-back on the HIV&AIDS WPP and so be able to improve it. 
They were asked to brief shift A employees about the participation conditions 
precisely and to mention the pens as rewards for completing the questionnaire. 
The completed questionnaires were collected in a sealed box by the same peer 
educators during the shift. Every participant received a pen as reward.  
 
The same questionnaire was also distributed by two other peer educators to all 
employees of the next shift, shift B, but only after all shift B employees had been 
well informed by the same peer educators about company’s decision to 
organize a ruffle the day after company’s wellness day in which all employees 
that will have gone for HIV testing on wellness day (planned approximately two 
weeks later) will participate and have a chance of winning one R2000 or one 
R500 or ten R50 gift vouchers. Both peer educators were not aware of the 
experiment at any time of the experiment. They were briefed just before the 
beginning of shift B that the questionnaire was part of a survey to improve 
company’s HIV&AIDS WPP. They were asked, first, to brief staff about the ruffle 
by using the specially designed flyers (see annexure B), secondly to inform 
about the survey’s questionnaire and, thirdly, to mention the pens as rewards for 
participating in the survey. The peer educators collected the completed 
questionnaires during the shift in a sealed box and distributed pens as rewards.  
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 6. Results 
 
The results show that there is a significant difference between willingness to 
participate in on-site voluntary counselling and testing when incentive are 
offered and when no incentives are offered. 
 
All targeted 66 employees in company V and all target 65 employees in 
company M returned completed questionnaires. 
 
In company V, 47% of shift A employees agreed or strongly agreed to go for on-
site HIV testing if it was offered in the company the next day. 77.78% of shift B 
employees agreed or strongly agreed to go for on-site HIV testing if it was 
offered in the company the next day. This means that in company V, 62% more 
shift B than shift A employees agreed and strongly agreed to go for HIV testing 
if it was offered on-site the next day.  
 
When repeating the same experiment two days later in company M, 50% of shift 
A employees agreed or strongly agreed to go for on-site HIV testing if it was 
offered in the company the next day. 74.19% of shift B employees agreed or 
strongly agreed to go for on-site HIV testing if it was offered in the company the 
next day. This means that in company M, 48% more shift B than shift A 
employees agreed and strongly agreed to go for HIV testing if it was offered in 
the company the next day.  
 
In both companies, shift B had proportionally more employees that were willing 
to participate in on-site HIV testing if it was offered in the company the next day.  
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 A t-test for significance of differences between the means of the two groups was 
calculated as described in the following. 
 
In this study, two shifts were administrated different information, so the study 
had a between participants design. There was one independent variable, with 
two levels consisting in providing information about incentives or not. The 
different shifts A and B were given different amounts of information, so there 
were two groups of subjects. Therefore, according to the decision tree for 
selecting the appropriate statistical test (Christensen, 2007:414), the appropriate 
statistical test for analysing the data is an independent sample t-test. 
 
Table 1 shows the t value obtained for company V. 
 
 
Table 1: Results of t-test company V 
Hypothesis test results:     
μ1 : mean of I would go testing tomorrow,  shift A  
μ2 : mean of I would go testing tomorrow,  shift B  
μ1 - μ2 : mean difference     
H0 : μ1 - μ2 = 0     
HA : μ1 - μ2 ≠ 0     
(with pooled variances)     
Difference 
Sample 
Mean Std. Err. DF T-Stat 
P-
value 
μ1 - μ2 -0.6111111 0.301734 64 -2.025331 0.047 
 
 
 
From table 1 it is clear that there is a significant difference between the means 
of the two groups with t(64)=-2.02533, p<0.05 or p=0.047. The two-tailed p-
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 value equals 0.047. By conventional criteria, the difference between the means 
is considered to be statistically significant. 
 
The null hypothesis can thus be rejected. The experiment’s hypothesis 
“incentives significantly increase employees’ willingness to participate in on-site 
voluntary counselling and testing” is held in company V. 
 
Table 2 shows the t-value obtained for company M. 
 
 
Table 2: Results of t-test company M 
Hypothesis test results:     
μ1 : mean of I would go testing tomorrow,  shift A  
μ2 : mean of I would go testing tomorrow,  shift B  
μ1 - μ2 : mean difference     
H0 : μ1 - μ2 = 0     
HA : μ1 - μ2 ≠ 0     
(with pooled variances)     
Difference 
Sample 
Mean Std. Err. DF T-Stat 
P-
value 
μ1 - μ2 -0.5616698 0.278857 63 -2.01419 0.0483 
 
 
 
From Table 2 it is clear that there is a significant difference between the means 
of the two groups with t(63)=-2.01419, p<0.05 or p=0.0483. The two-tailed p- 
value equals 0.0483. By conventional criteria, this difference between the 
means is considered to be statistically significant. The null hypothesis can thus 
also be rejected in company M. The experiment’s hypothesis “incentives 
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 significantly increase employees’ willingness to participate in on-site voluntary 
counselling and testing” is held. 
 
The results show that there is a significant difference between willingness to 
participate in on-site voluntary counselling and testing when incentive are 
offered and when no incentives are offered in both companies. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
The experiment was designed in a way to assure, as far as it is possible in a 
field experiment, that the only relevant difference between shift A and shift B 
was due to the independent variable: the information given to group B about the 
offer of incentives for participating in on-site VCT.  
 
The hypothesis “incentives significantly increase employees’ willingness to 
participate in on-site VCT” was held confirming Jochelson’s statement that 
financial incentives are effective in encouraging people to perform clearly 
defined, time limited, simple behavioural tasks (Jochelson, 2007:2) as VCT was 
in this case.  
 
The fact that both experiments lead to similar results in both independent 
companies reinforces this research conclusions. 
 
The results of this field experiment indicate that there are strong reasons to 
believe that financial incentives used to increase employees’ on-site VCT 
uptake should have a bright future in SMEs. In company V, 62% and in 
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 company M, 48% more shift B than shift A employees agreed and strongly 
agreed to go testing for HIV if it was offered in the company the next day. If the 
assumption is made that these rates are applicable for companies’ actual VCT 
uptake, than managers and researchers can estimate the lever incentives worth 
R3000 have on the increase of employees’ on-site VCT uptake in similar 
settings. In companies V and M, this lever is considerable as 62% and 48% 
increase of VCT uptake were realised with just R3000  invested in incentives in 
each company, a very small fraction of the programmes’ total costs. With these 
results, this experiment can contribute to the process of finding out if incentives 
should become a best practice tool to be included in SMEs’ HIV&AIDS WPPs. 
 
For a significant number of employees, incentives easily helped to overcome the 
barriers of HIV testing, confirming Thornton’s statement (Thornton, 2005). The 
results therefore have strong policy implications for designing interventions to 
increase HIV-testing in SMEs in South Africa. 
 
As stated by Jochelson, the use of financial incentives to promote VCT uptake 
was simple and easy to implement. 
 
Originally, the questionnaires were designed to allow feed-back on the quality of 
companies’ wellness programmes which included the HIV&AIDS WPP. The 
analysis of employees’ answers to these questions reveals that the majority of 
employees were benefiting from the HIV&AIDS programme, were increasing 
their knowledge about HIV&AIDS, trusting the company and HIV&AIDS policy 
and satisfied with the programme and work of the peer educators. These 
results, that have not statistically been evaluated, confirm Jochelson’s finding 
that in both companies V and M financial incentives offered were useful as one 
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 element of a multi-faceted programme (the HIV&AIDS WPP) that addresses the 
complexity of individual, social and economic factors that affect human 
behaviour.  
 
This experiment brought some useful data for one specific setting (as described 
in chapter 3). The existing evidence base is too limited for us to make definitive 
conclusions about the conditions under which incentives are effective. Further 
research is needed to understand when financial incentives are likely to be most 
effective in encouraging on-site VCT uptake.  
 
Following limitations have to be considered when interpreting the results. 
 
Although the companies V and M were randomly selected from those available 
in a cluster of five companies the researcher was implementing HIV&AIDS 
WPPs at the time of the experiment, this study is limited to the types of 
companies that the researcher was working with: small and medium-sized 
South African automotive supplier companies that have more than 50 and less 
than 250 employees (permanent and non-permanent staff together) and their 
environment. 
 
Both companies were implementing comprehensive HIV&AIDS WPPs for the 
first time, were nearly at the end of the implementation process and offered free 
on-site VCT for the first time. The effect of incentives in other circumstances, for 
example in the second year of an HIV&AIDS WPP, might be different and would 
have to be investigated. 
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 Varying the four factors, value, timing, social support and skills, identified by 
Jochelson (Jochelson,2007:6f) could significantly change the effect of incentives 
on employees’ on-site VCT uptake. This study’s experiment only considers one 
specific setting of these four factors. 
 
No influence on the composition of shift A and shift B in both companies could 
be taken. The assignment of employees cannot be considered as random 
selection of research participants. Employees were assigned to both shifts 
according to the needs of production by the production managers. The criteria 
for this selection are not known to the experimenter. This way of assignment, 
does not follow a procedure for randomly assigning participants to experimental 
treatment conditions (see for example Christensen, 2008:267f). Therefore, it 
does not provide maximum assurance that a systematic bias does not exist in 
the selection process and that companies’ production managers’ choice lead to 
the selection of samples that are representative of each company’s targeted 
total population. This field experiment did not allow any other procedure. The 
comparison in point 5.1 showed that there are small demographic differences 
between the two samples in both companies. These differences are considered 
to be small but could lead to a bias of the results. This study did not investigate 
if any correlations exist between demographic data and the dependent variable.  
 
Another source of bias might have come from a participant effect. Participants’ 
behaviour might have been influenced by the perceptions and motives they 
bring with them. Answering the experiment question, they might have been 
motivated to present themselves in the best possible light or vice versa. It can 
be assumed that this bias was reduced by running the experiment in two 
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 independent companies and using an anonymous questionnaire. It can also be  
assumed that this participant effect was neutralised between both shifts. 
 
The researcher did not interfere at any time in data collection. The peer 
educators that distributed and collected the questionnaires and briefed the 
participants might be a source of experimental attribute error. The field 
experiment did not allow control over this effect as the researcher did not select 
these peer educators. It can be assumed that this effect is reduced by the fact 
that the experiment was run in two independent companies. 
 
It was impossible to reliably study the effect of incentives on employees’ VCT 
uptake directly because of the reasons stated in chapter 4. The assumption was 
made that if an employee, a few weeks before company’s announced 
HIV&AIDS testing day, after being informed about the offer of incentives is more 
willing to participate in VCT than when he/she is not informed, then employee’s 
attitude towards VCT uptake has changed. In this case, an increase in VCT 
uptake is inferred from an increase in employee’s willingness to participate in 
VCT. The experiment does  not measure the actual effect of incentives on VCT 
uptake or on acknowledging the serostatus like in Thornton’s experiment 
(Thornton, 2005). The results of this experiment only allow estimations about 
the actual VCT uptake. 
 
The questionnaire included following three questions indirectly related to on-site 
VCT: 
Question nine: It is important that I know my HIV status as soon as possible. 
Question eleven: I prefer to go testing outside the company. 
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 Question fourteen: It has more advantages to do an HIV&AIDS test in the 
company than in public clinics. 
For these questions, no significant difference between the means of the two 
groups could be calculated. The offer of incentives did not produce a significant 
effect on these statements.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The research hypothesis “incentives significantly increase employees’ 
willingness to participate in on-site Voluntary Counselling and Testing” is held 
using a significance level for a two tailed test of 0.05 in both companies. This 
confirms Jochelson’s statement that financial incentives are effective in 
encouraging people to perform clearly defined, time limited, simple behavioural 
tasks (Jochelson, 2007:2) as VCT was in this experiment. 
 
On-site VCT being a crucial part of HIV&AIDS WPPs, the results of this 
experiment indicate that there are strong reasons to believe that incentives 
should become a best practice tool and so have a bright future.  
 
For a significant number of employees, incentives easily helped to overcome the 
barriers of HIV-testing, like Thornton found in her experiment (Thornton, 2005). 
These results have strong policy implications for designing interventions to 
increase HIV testing in South African SMEs. 
 
In company V, 62% and in company M, 48% more shift B than shift A 
employees agreed and strongly agreed to go HIV testing if it was offered in the 
company the next day. Assuming that these rates are applicable for companies’ 
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actual VCT uptake, managers and researchers can estimate the lever incentives 
worth R3000  have on the increase of employees’ on-site VCT uptake in similar 
settings. In experiment’s companies, this lever is considerable as 62% and 48% 
increase of VCT uptake were realised with just R3000 invested in incentives in 
each company, a very small fraction of the programmes’ total costs.  
 
As stated by Jochelson (2007), the use of financial incentives to promote VCT 
uptake was simple and easy to implement in both companies. 
 
This study confirms Jochelson’s finding that financial incentives are useful as 
one element of a multi-faceted programme (the HIV&AIDS WPP) that addresses 
the complexity of individual, social and economic factors that affect human 
behaviour.  
 
This experiment produced useful data for one specific setting present in both 
companies, still the existing evidence base is too limited to make definitive 
conclusions about the conditions under which incentives are effective. Further 
research is needed to understand when financial incentives are likely to be most 
effective in encouraging on-site VCT uptake in SMEs. 
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 Annexure A 
Questionnaire used in companies V and M 
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 Annexure B 
Flyer used to inform shift B employees about the incentives  
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